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Chapter 2

A philosophical shock: Foucault reading
Nietzsche, reading Heidegger
Babette E. Babich

Michel Foucault analyzes the formation of the ‘subject’ or ‘self’ in a postNietzschean, post-Heideggerian, quasi-Marxist, or today, we had better
correct that to say, just because few scholars have any desire to be named
Marxist: simply, vaguely leftist context,1 exceeding what has been called the
poststructuralist as much as the postmodern moment by means of different epistemic discourses of imitation, representation, but also rhetorical
or ‘stylistic’ discourses and including practical or therapeutic analysis.2
Additionally, to recall the important question of practice and the increasingly popular language of philosophical therapy, more than Nietzsche’s
vision of either convalescence (and nihilism) or healing or indeed of the
philosopher as lawgiver or a physician of culture, Foucault is illuminated
by Pierre Hadot’s analysis of the Stoic ‘art’ of philosophy as ‘a way of life.’3
To many readers, Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche has seemed the most
obvious of all and to the degree that Foucault’s epistemology foregrounds
the genealogical transferences of power or its productive technologies,
including the calculative stratagems and technologies of the body, manifest in the history of the natural and social or human sciences, as in art
and literature, Foucault’s analysis has often been read as a straightforward
elaboration/continuation of Nietzsche’s own ‘genealogy’ (as if this itself
were somehow a transparent affair as I have long argued that it is not)4
and this is often coordinate with a variety of efforts to distinguish the two,
where all such distinctions are always effective associations. 5
Nietzsche’s arch-polemical and highly elliptical genealogy goes beyond
Foucault’s rather more traditional understanding of genealogy if only
because and in great measure, Nietzsche often invents his genealogies
which is not to say that he makes them up but only that he ‘paints’ his
genealogies, like his hopes, on the metaphorically conceptual wall (Beyond
Good and Evil (BGE) §296) in bold colors and broad strokes for the sake of
what he called his future and for Nietzsche that future always means the
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reader. In this fashion, Nietzsche would compose his The Gay Science as a
complex readerly appeal to philologists and scholars cum scientists of all
stripes, recasting his first book, The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music
in terms of the chronologically, culturally different example of the gai sabre
that was the song tradition of the Provencal knight-poets or troubadours.6
Highlighting Nietzsche’s re-envisioning of his first elaboration of the relation between music and word, one has also to note how very tendentious
this had, inevitably, to be for Nietzsche and if only because and very like
Foucault in this regard, Nietzsche also and always sought to do more than
just one thing in any of his writings.7
In this multifarious fashion, Nietzsche concludes the first book of The Gay
Science with a provocation against the all-too common ‘clamor about distress’ and the habit of those who seemingly seek suffering (Nietzsche’s readers imagine that he is here thinking of Schopenhauer or else of Wagner
but the reference is perfectly political, where Nietzsche denounces the slogan ‘Neediness is needed! [Not ist nötig],’ a political convention that has
yet to go out of style). Against the ‘clamor’ of the ‘politicians,’ against the
youthful enthusiasms of those who, as Nietzsche puts it, ‘do not know what
to do with themselves,’ Nietzsche proposes yet another and still indeed
very Foucauldian tactic, one little adverted to by his advocates who often
miss his extraordinarily melancholy but still and perfectly solar or divine
joy: ‘—Pardon me, my friends,’ Nietzsche writes in a style captivating for
Derrida and others on the seductive and forgotten art of friendship, ‘I have
ventured to paint my happiness on the wall.’ (The Gay Science (GS) §56).
This painted, dappled happiness would be a ‘happiness humanity has not
known thus far’ (GS §337). Like the sun at evening, when ‘even the poorest
fisherman rows with golden oars,’ this would be ‘the happiness of a god full
of power and love, full of tears and laughter’ (Ibid., cf. GS §383).

Foucault and Nietzsche; Foucault and Heidegger
Although there is no lack of efforts to read Foucault and Nietzsche together
or indeed to align Foucault and Heidegger, Foucault scholarship overall tends to be split on these same terms. In the following, I argue that
the opposition is misleading for the complicated reason that Foucault’s
Heidegger can only be understood on Nietzschean terms while and at the
same time, Foucault’s Nietzsche only takes place by way of Heidegger albeit
(and this point simply cannot be overemphasized) a very Frencophone
reading of Heidegger.8
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For these and other reasons, reading Foucault qua Nietzschean (apart
from Foucault’s Heidegger) is as misleading as reading Foucault qua
Heideggerian (apart from Foucault’s Nietzsche). The difficulty here,
both singularizing and pernicious, is that reading both Nietzsche and
Heidegger apart from one another is so common as to be automatic.
Explicitly Heideggerian readings of Foucault are thus inclined to content
themselves with more rather than less stumbling caricatures of Nietzsche
and the same can be said for Nietzschean readings of Foucault which tend
to be less clumsy than patently, vehemently anti-Heideggerian.
Critics on both sides argue that Foucault overlooks the philosophical
specificity of either Nietzsche or Heidegger and that he does so for the sake
of his own very particular social analyses of praxes and institutions. On the
level of rhetoric, Foucault appropriates what he can take to be Nietzschean
tactics for his own purposes—Michel de Certeau is superb on this,9 —but it
can also be argued that such rhetorical aims work in a wholly other sense in
Nietzsche’s similarly ambitious strategy as a writer, effecting a tactical chiasm between Foucault and Nietzsche as between Foucault and Heidegger.

Marx, Freud, Nietzsche: in Ricoeur’s shadow
Foucault is at times read together with Nietzsche,10 at times regarded as a
‘Nietzschean’ of sorts and at times as if Foucault’s work simply elaborated
upon or developed the Nietzschean project that is supposed to carry the
name of a ‘genealogy’11 alternately opposed, somewhat artificially given
the pleonastic character of the term for Foucault, to an archaeology. There
is, as part of this, a vague reflection on matters of philosophical style and
rhetoric, taking Foucault to be a master tactician in this regard and noting
that Nietzsche too might be regarded in the same way. Indeed with respect
to rhetoric and style, supposedly sanctioned readings of Foucault have
been more or less winnowed from the rest, or so one pretends. But reading
Foucault, like reading Deleuze, like reading Nietzsche and Heidegger, is
itself a thoroughly politicized business where some and only some readings are engaged (or to be explicit rather than allusive: only some readings
of what seem to be a limitless and seemingly interdisciplinary array are
cited/criticized/discussed)12 and others are not. In addition to such selective scholarly receptivity we may add the bean-counting politics of scholarly
name-dropping, and today one finds less and less the older argument that
Foucault’s genealogy continues an archaeological project13 that somehow
begins if not with Freud than surely with Nietzsche. Gary Shapiro offers an
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important correction of this habitual reading of Foucault, taken indeed
on Foucault’s own terms14 just where Foucault contends that his project is a
critical one that may be traced back to Kant.
Writing as ‘Maurice Florence,’ Foucault contends that to ‘the extent that
Foucault fits into the philosophical tradition, it is the critical tradition of Kant,
and his project could be called a Critical History of Thought.’15 In just such
a Kantian modality, Foucault is able to specify that ‘a critical history of
thought would be an analysis of those conditions under which certain relations of subject to object are formed or modified, insofar as those relations
constitute a possible knowledge [savoir].’16
It is in this critical spirit17 that Foucault responds to Ricoeur’s lectures
on Freud,18 setting Nietzsche alongside Marx and Freud. For his own part,
Ricoeur reflects on ‘Interpretation as Exercise of Suspicion,’ invoking
the three musketeers of hermeneutics Nietzsche, Freud, and Marx, the
‘three masters of suspicion,’19 I note that it is significant, revelatory even,
that Ricoeur appropriates Nietzsche’s already conventional invocation
not merely of the word but the phrasing of a ‘school of suspicion,’ where
Nietzsche, in a late-written preface to Human, All too Human reminds
his readers that his ‘writings have been called a school of suspicion [eine
Schule des Verdachts] . . .’ [HH §i]. Ricoeur’s naming convention became
standard even beyond Foucualt, hence one may read Jean-Luc Marion’s
Idol and Distance as offering another set of contenders for a new era, very
nearly post-political, in the guise of Nietzsche, Hölderlin, Denys.20 Nor
is it irrelevant that in, and amidst, such variations, Nietzsche remains
constant.
Jefferey Minson has argued that associations such as these and others do
not license us to reduce Foucault to Nietzsche (bracketing for the space of
this essay just what such a reduction might mean).21 Nevertheless a range
of critically epistemic tactics often associated with Nietzsche recur in
Foucault. If Nietzsche goes further than Foucault it is because he does not
merely claim, in a provocative instantiation of what most commentators call
his perspectivism, that ‘there is no truth’ but continues further to compound
his own reflections, further reflecting upon the perspectival significance of
such perspectives on perspectives and as such.22 Indeed, Nietzsche’s philosophy, early and late, is a sustained reflection upon the significance of or
else on the consequences of this very lack of truth and our fondness for or
belief in the truth (this corresponds to what he calls, and in a serried array:
our asceticism and our piety).
For Douglas Smith, the interpretive dynamic or contest between Ricoeur
and Foucault (and I would add here: Deleuze) inevitably excludes Heidegger,
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which did not mean (as Smith observes with some understatement) that
Heidegger had no role to play. Smith’s point is set contra Vincent Descombes’
interpretive troika for the explication of ‘French Philosophy.’ Thus the triad
‘Marx, Freud and Nietzsche,’ drawn from Ricoeur, functionally adumbrates
not the relevance of Heidegger for Foucault but his irrelevance. Heidegger
is as absent from Foucault as from Ricoeur, a claim repeated in tension with
Foucault’s last interview ‘My whole philosophical development has been
determined by my reading of Heidegger. But I acknowledge it was Nietzsche
who got the upper hand.’23
But Foucault’s French readers are inherently strangers neither to
Nietzsche nor to Heidegger and one can argue that, ceteris paribus, the following reflections might also be extended to a reading of such (I am here
speaking of Deleuze but it is important to emphasize that one might just as
well refer to others such as de Certeau and Baudrillard, etc.).24
Heidegger himself is yet another story and not only for Foucault scholars. Hence and although one has now the benefit of several readings
of Foucault and Heidegger, 25 one continues even here and even for
such recent perspectives, to be faced with a neatly exclusive disjunction between either Heidegger and Foucault or Nietzsche and Foucault
but rarely both together. As already noted, most French readers can be
counted as exceptions, like Janicaud in addition to scholars like Prado
and others.
For it is key that with Foucault one has to do with a continental thinker
who has enjoyed a long and fruitful reception among analytic scholars (not
only Hubert Dreyfus and Gary Gutting but also Ian Hacking, etc.) in addition indeed to interdisciplinary readings that extend throughout the social
sciences.26

Foucault and Heidegger
If one has had one’s Heidegger only by way of analytic readings such as
Dreyfus’ (very) influential approach, the very same and still very analytic
lens often reveals rather more Heidegger in Foucault than Foucault himself liked to confess.27 As a corollary, it may be added that a good part
of the reason for deciding that a lion’s share of the influence between
Nietzsche and Heidegger should be given to Nietzsche derives from the
habit of assuming that what a thinker says in his last publications represents what he ‘really,’ somehow, thinks. So we take Foucault’s off-hand
reflections as an ultimate confession: ‘. . . I am simply a Nietzschean, and
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I try to see, on a number of points,and to the extent that it is possible,
with the aid of Nietzsche’s text—but also with anti-Nietzschean theses
(which are nevertheless Nietzschean!)—what can be done in this or that
domain.’28 And yet what does Foucault tells us here? Perhaps it worth
noting that by speaking of ‘anti-Nietzschean theses (which are nonetheless Nietzschean!)’ Foucault adumbrates an identifiably Heideggerian
reading of Nietzsche.29
One can and one has been urged to sidestep the rigors of both
Nietzsche’s perspectivalism and his critique of the scientific limits of science. Most readers have enough to do follow Foucault. Indeed, Foucault
himself has enough to do as when he reflects on the locus of power in writing and the diminution of the writer in modern times. Hence and on the
specifically political issue of technoscience and biopower, Foucault could
suggest that the modern scientific intellectual ‘emerged’ in the wake of
the Second World War, ‘as a point of transition between the universal
and the specific intellectual.’30 For Foucault, speaking of Oppenheimer
in this particular context, it was owing to a very ‘direct and localised
relation to scientific knowledge and institutions that the atomic scientist
could make his intervention; but, since the nuclear threat affected the
whole human race and the fate of the world, his discourse could at the
same time be the discourse of the universal.’31 In the context of such
‘technico-scientific structures’ (and with respect to nuclear scientists, but
also pharmacists and computer experts, etc.), Foucault is able to point
out that ‘[t]ruth is’ in effect ‘a thing of this world: it is produced only
by virtue of multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular effects
of power. Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of
truth,’ i.e., ‘the types of discourses which it accepts and makes function
as true.’32 As Foucault explains, and one can read Nietzsche (and indeed
Heidegger on the same questions), such truth functional discourse technologies include ‘the mechanisms and instances which enable one to
distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition
of truth; the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as
true.’33 Thus Foucault refers no less to Nietzsche than to Kant’s conception
of belief or opinion as holding for true [für Wahrhalten, tenir-pour-vrai].
But to connect such a critical perspective on truth as well as technoscience and thence indeed to include, as Foucault includes, politics/
society one needs to add Heidegger to Foucault’s Nietzschean and critical Kantianism (if only because Adorno would constitute an alternative
or competing voice).
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Foucault-Heidegger-Nietzsche: the politics of influence
I have been emphasizing the interpretive consequences to be drawn from
the simplistic yet still dominant habit of reading either Heidegger or
Nietzsche but rarely both together (the problem is compounded when one
omits, as one tends to do in both cases, Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s Kant
or else and indeed Heidegger’s and Nietzsche’s Descartes). One assumes
that Heidegger and Nietzsche are somehow antithetical thinkers, despite
the famous/infamous detail that Heidegger devotes more of his writing
(and reading) to Nietzsche than to any other thinker with the possible
exception of Aristotle, whom Heidegger however also read as propadeutic
to a reading of Nietzsche (not the worst idea in the world, provided indeed
one reads one’s Aristotle as Nietzsche did, and that is critically not categorically). Thus, we noted that Hans Sluga felt no need to integrate Foucault’s
recollection that he ‘had to read Nietzsche in the fi fties . . . Nietzsche
alone did not appeal to me’ with his own claim that what was decisive for
Foucault was Heidegger and not Nietzsche.34 It is likewise instructive that
Dreyfus dismisses Foucault’s Nietzschean allusions although he too quotes
the same final interview to emphasize his own focus on Heidegger.35 The
problem, of course, turns upon Heidegger’s political liabilities (to speak
gingerly here) and if Foucault is best set as far to the anarchic left as can
be imagined (for an enthusiast of all things American, as he was), Foucault
still and very blithely asserts contra the intellectually respectable dynamite
that was/is Nietzsche and the very easy associative work that it is to read
his genealogy as of a piece with Nietzsche that the decisive coordination
was the two taken together, that is, Nietzsche and Heidegger. The combination functioned for Foucault, as it still ought to function for anyone, as an
exactly ‘philosophical shock.’36
Indeed, the ongoing shock is and remains this same conjunction. If
Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger highlights a connection
that may have been old news for (classically formed!) continental readers
(it is the very point of departure, indeed for David Allison’s pathbreaking
book collection, The New Nietzsche),37 Heidegger’s specific role in France
has recently been highlighted in Janicaud’s two volume Heidegger en France
and (for Anglophone readers), Ethan Kleinberg’s Generation Existential.38
Indeed I argue that such political and sociological issues can often be the
only thing at stake in deciding who one cites and who one does not cite but
also whether or not one finds a thinker to have been influential.39 We tend
as Nietzsche says not merely to find just and only what we are looking for
but we also tend to be incapable of seeing anything else.
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Reading
We will be hard pressed to answer the question of debt or influence with
respect to the question of Heidegger and Foucault just because, and like
other French authors, Foucault himself does not read his Nietzsche or
indeed his Heidegger as Anglophone scholars tend to read Nietzsche and
Heidegger. That is: what Foucault does not do is ‘read’ (or cite) certain
texts and then explain these same cited texts to readers who have already
read (and indeed often cited and explained) the same texts themselves.
The problem is compounded (and hence we have the problem to begin
with) because and as we have noted the ‘influence’ of his interviewers,
when asked about such influences Foucault amiably acknowledges the
same. So far so good, but how are we to understand the very idea of an
intellectual ‘debt’?
We might go further and actually read Foucault. If so we may find ourselves in difficult straits, for Nietzsche tells us that reading does not come
to us automatically: we need first to learn to read, and then we need to
read in fact or actually, something we do only reluctantly and then only
with authors who matter, or where the investment can pay us back (for the
sake of, or as Nietzsche said, in order to write a book or essay of one’s own:
in just such cases, so Nietzsche points out, one is, as Heidegger would say,
still not reading).
To trace Foucault’s reading of Nietzsche and Heidegger we ourselves
need to read but that means to read as Nietzsche reminded us that one
might read, rather than merely set off on a hunt for relevant names.40
To this degree, any effort to limn Nietzsche’s influence on Foucault has
more to do with random detail than Foucault’s specific engagement with
Nietzsche or with the inevitably metonymic Nietzscheanism of French
philosophy—a Nietzscheanism culminating, with a Freudian tic troped
by a pretended denial in Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut’s collection, Pourquoi
nous ne sommes pas nietzschéens /Why We Are Not Nietzscheans.41 The authors in
this collection hardly oppose Nietzsche as much as they reflect upon the
loss of a certain way of philosophizing in Nietzsche’s name. Thus Robert
Legros muses: ‘How could a philosopher not be a Nietzschean, when all of
Nietzsche’s philosophy sets out to radicalize the two quests that are at the
very birth of philosophy: to criticize the obvious tenets that carpet the world
and, through, creation, to evoke wonder at the irreducible enigma the world
conceals? How,’ he repeats for emphasis, ‘to pretend to be a philosopher
without feeling oneself to be Nietzschean?’42 A similar sentiment echoes in
Alain Raynaud’s insightful reflection on Nietzsche’s critical enlightenment
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perspective on the enlightenment itself, as a post-Kantian project that
was begun but ought not end with Nietzsche. Raynaud thus argues that if
‘Nietzsche can make of the Aufklärung an instrument for his critique of
Reason, then we in turn can make of his “irrationalism” the means to continue the liberation that began with the Enlightenment.’ 43 Looking to
the very same Kantian adumbration of the question of enlightenment as
his own self-description, his own very formalistic ecce homo, emphasizes it,
Michel Foucault’s philosophy continues the same critical tradition.

Science and The Birth of the Clinic
We have come to hear the relevance of Canguilhem and Cavailles in
Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic but of course the same text can be read
between both Heidegger and Nietzsche as indeed with reference to other
names, especially, and this is significant, in the philosophy of science. How
do scientists see? How does science progress? There are convergent parallels with Norwood Russell Hanson’s extremely suggestive Patterns of Discovery
but there are also parallels in Heidegger’s Being and Time and (specifically
for Foucault’s analysis) in Heidegger’s ‘Science and World-Picture’ [Zeit des
Weltbildes] a lecture from 1938, the same year in which the first translation of Heidegger’s work into French appeared (and including selections
from Being and Time) in the collection Qu’est ce que la Métaphysique? 44 To
Heidegger one must also add Merleau-Ponty especially with regard to the
specific notion of phenomenology to which Foucault himself makes reference. De Certeau, again, is useful here as he reminds us that what Foucault
‘discerns at this level’45 is ‘the move [le geste] which has organized a discursive space.’ De Certeau points out that what is ‘decisive’ in such practices
is less a matter of such discourses as might exclude ‘people from normal
social intercourse’ than the very Cartesian, ‘miniscule and ubiquitously
reproduced move of “gridding” (quadriller) a visible space in such a way as
to make its occupants available for observation and “information.” ’46 If this
is the panoptic example of Discipline and Punish, this is also the effective
invention of modern medicine (all diagnosis, test, and demonstration—
and less and less a matter of healing: that issue remains the patient’s problem not the clinician’s, henceforth medicine is no longer a matter of the
relationship between ‘sickness and what alleviated it’ [The Birth of the Clinic
(BC 55)] but a matter of teaching, of show and tell, the patient remade as
an ‘object of positive knowledge’ [BC 197; cf. xviii]) as Foucault details this
in The Birth of the Clinic.
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Speaking here of the change of clinical discourse and the changing
perceptions of the ‘greyness of things,’ Foucault writes of the relation
between ‘ “things” and “words” where . . . seeing and saying still are one.
We must reexamine the original distribution of the visible and invisible
insofar as it is linked with the division between what is stated and remains
as unsaid.’47 Here Foucault alludes to Heidegger’s emphasis on physis as well
as his unmistakable notion of truth as aletheia, where Foucault notes the
Heraclitean ‘obscurity, the density of things closed upon themselves’ and
the illuminating power of ‘the gaze that passes over them, around them,
and gradually into them, bringing them nothing more than its own light.
The residence of truth in the dark centre of things is linked, paradoxically, to this sovereign power of the empirical gaze . . .’48 In his preface to
The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault reads not only Heidegger but Nietzsche, as
he himself attests to this influence, beginning with the title The Birth of the
Clinic but also in Foucault’s fourth section, entitled: ‘The Old Age of the
Clinic’ echoing the theme of the decline and the death of tragedy that was
the subject of Nietzsche’s The Birth of Tragedy out of the Spirit of Music.
Foucault’s readings between both Nietzsche and Heidegger are thus much
closer to Heidegger’s own readings of Nietzsche than American scholarship
tends to recognize, hence Foucault’s coordination of Nietzsche, Hölderlin,
and Heidegger.49 This ‘French’ Heidegger raises the question of the subject as Foucault poses it as a radically critical challenge (and not an appeal
to a transcendental humanism) and when Foucault moves between anticipated or likely alternatives as so many misunderstandings he is reading
rival theorists as much as Nietzsche and indeed and especially Heidegger.
Thus with respect to ‘living individuality’ and beyond the highly charged
(because philosophically decisive) ‘old Aristotelian law, which prohibited
the application of scientific discourse to the individual’ (BC 170) in his
prefatory reflections on the status of ‘scientifically structured discourse
about an individual’ (BC xiv), Foucault recalls that ‘accession to the individual’ recalls ‘the most concentrated formulation of an old medical
humanism’ (ibid.) before going on to invoke the ‘mindless phenomenologies of understanding’ (and here Foucault deploys a very Nietzschean
characterization) referring to the ‘sand of their conceptual desert’ and
thence to the Heideggerian notion of the ‘non-thought’ (ibid.). Each
move alludes neither to Heidegger nor to Nietzsche but to a Heidegger
who reads Nietzsche. Sharing a Heideggerian lineage, Foucault’s genealogy does not simply move to a kind of archaeology (any more than Bruno
Latour’s strong sociology of science simply becomes a polite engineer’s history of lionized science).
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In a voice including the language of Heidegger on science as much as
Canguilhelm, Foucault writes that ‘[m]edicine made its appearance as a
clinical science in conditions which define, together with its historical possibility, the domain of its experience and the structure of its rationality’
(BC xv). The critique thus invoked calls not only for Heidegger’s reading of
Kant’s critique but for Nietzsche’s reading of the same critique:
It may well be that we belong to an age of criticism whose lack of primary philosophy reminds us at every moment of its reign and its fatality: an intelligence that keeps us irremediably at a distance from an
original language. For Kant, the possibility and necessity of critique
were linked through certain scientific contents, to the fact that there is
such a thing as knowledge. In our time – and Nietzsche the philologist
testifies to it – they are linked to the fact that language exists and that,
in the innumerable words spoken by men – whether they are reasonable or senseless, demonstrative or poetic – a meaning has taken shape
that hangs over us, leading us forward in our blindness, but awaiting in
the darkness for us to attain awareness before emerging into the light
of day and speaking. We are doomed historically to history, to the
patient construction of discourses about discourses and to the task of
hearing what has already been said. (BC xv–xvi)
Nietzsche asks us to pay attention to the names and this we pretend to do,
more often than not. Like Heidegger, Foucault, is one of Nietzsche’s rare
readers to suggest that we attend to Nietzsche’s questions. If Heidegger calls
emphatic attention to what Nietzsche means by science [Wissenschaft] drawing a parallel to love and to passion [Leidenschaft], Foucault emphasizes not
only about origin and genesis [Ursprung, Herkunft, Entstehung, Genealogie]
but also the good [agathon].50 Foucault thus alludes to the first section of
On the Genealogy of Morals, where Nietzsche raises the question ‘what was
the real etymological significance of the designations for ‘good’ coined
in the various languages?’ (GM I: 4) contending as Nietzsche mused that
‘they all led back to the same conceptual transformation’ (ibid.). Indeed,
Nietzsche concludes the first section of his ‘polemic’ (the polemical scholarly attack is, as we recall, the rigorously ‘suspicious’ subtitle of Nietzsche’s
Genealogy: Eine Streitschrift) with a reprisal of this same question: ‘What light
does linguistics, and especially the study of etymology, throw on the history of the evolution of moral concepts?’ (GM I: 17)
The challenge as Nietzsche poses it is one Foucault embraces, where
Nietzsche contends that ‘every table of values, every “thou shalt” known to
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history or ethnology, requires first a physiological investigation and interpretation, rather than a psychological one; and every one of them needs a critique on the part of medical science.’ (Ibid.). Foucault seems post-Kantian
as he notes almost in Heidegger’s voice that ‘in stating what has been said,
one has to re-state what has never been said’ (BC xvi). Here Foucault points
to what is elicited via questioning and its power to call forth ‘a remainder
that is the very essence of that thought, driven outside its secret.’’ (Ibid.).
Both the later Heidegger and the Heidegger of ‘What is Metaphysics?’
echo Foucault’s declaration that ‘this unspoken element slumbers within
speech,’ especially, singularly to be articulated in questioning.
Speech is thus for Foucault ‘an act of “translation”,’ which means that ‘it
has the dangerous privilege images have of showing while concealing’ (xvii).
One is not merely using the language of semiology and reading in what de
Certeau called the squared or ‘gridded’ field of the clinic but an aural, haptic, ocular discursive adaptability that continually changes with the technologies of its adumbration, requiring ‘a sort of sensorial triangulation in
which various atlases, hitherto excluded from medical techniques, must collaborate: the ear and touch are added to sight’ (163). In this triangulation
one has not to do with three senses to which one might someday add one
or two but with the enhancement and transformation of ocularity as such
and that is to say of vision. ‘The structure that commands clinical anatomy,
and all medicine that derives from it, is that of invisible visibility.’ (165). A
Zarathustran echo in the idea (and the ideal) of ‘immaculate perception’ is
also at work in Nietzsche’s late-written preface to The Gay Science in a remark
Nietzsche sets into the mouth of a girl-child. From such a moralizing, moralistic perspective, Nietzsche reflects on the purely epistemological idea of
an all-seeing, all-knowing god, the very idea of a transcendental, timeless,
ultimate truth: ‘Today we consider it a matter of decency not to wish to
see everything naked, or to be present at everything, or to understand and
“know” everything. “Is it true that God is present everywhere?” a little girl
asked her mother; “I think that’s indecent.” (GS §iv)
Emphasizing that ‘at the end of the eighteenth century . . . education was
given a positive value as enlightenment’ (BC 64), the language Foucault
uses of the ‘birth of truth’ (ibid.) recalls Nietzsche’s emphasis on the ‘lateborn’ status of truth among human beings and indeed the discourse of
corrective regulation. This for Nietzsche is the scientific conviction of our
age: namely ‘the unshakable faith that thought, using the thread of logic,
can penetrate the deepest abysses of being, and that thought is capable not
only of knowing being but even of correcting it.’’ (The Birth of Tragedy (BT)
§15)). Foucault goes on, as Nietzsche goes on, to add nudity, the physician’s
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‘invisible visibility,’ the same nudity Nietzsche seems to invoke when he
speaks in the section of The Birth of Tragedy that seems relevant here:
‘[t]here would be no science if it concerned itself only with one naked
goddess’ (BT §15).
The point for Nietzsche as for Foucault is the point of perversion and
the distractive, sustaining focus on revelation, the intellectual bachelor’s
investigative ‘laying bare,’ yet this ‘perverse’ emphasis does not follow for
the reasons one might imagine. Hence Nietzsche contrasts the gaze of the
scientist (or Foucault’s clinician) with the artist: ‘[w]henever the truth is
uncovered, the artist will always cling with rapt gaze to what still remains
covering even after such uncovering; but the theoretical man enjoys and
finds satisfaction in the discarded covering and finds the highest object
of his pleasure in the process of an ever happy uncovering that succeeds
through his own efforts.’ (Ibid.).
Foucault speaks of ‘a language that did not owe its truth to speech but to
the gaze alone’ (BC 69) and Heidegger speaks of calculation, a terminology echoing in Foucault in what is also indeed the Marxist sensibility of his
discourse (cf. BC 83–85). Drawing, as Nietzsche does, upon the inherently
“ocular” (88) interest of science, Foucault also traces the genesis of the
pathological “fact” apart from the vagaries of individual illness, the invention of positive diagnosis, the birth of the clinic:
In the period of Laplace, either under his influence or within a similar
movement of thought, medicine discovered that uncertainty may be
treated, analytically, as the sum of a certain number of isolatable degrees
of certainty that were capable of rigorous calculation. Thus this confused, negative concept . . . was to be capable of transforming itself into
a positive concept and offered to the penetration of a technique proper
to calculation. (97)
Speaking in terms of ‘events of the open domain’ (98), the clinic is read in
Heideggerian terms that echo with Merleau-Ponty and Canguilhelm. And
it is Canguilhelm who can be heard (along with Bataille) when Foucault
compares ‘chest diseases’ with venereal diseases, as ‘diseases of love: they
are the Passion, a life to which death gives a face that cannot be exchanged.’
(172). If this reference to death inevitably recalls Being and Time and the
death that is ultimately and always mine (and not just a trivial inevitability
or a tragical fate not to be outgone), death is also the inherently singularizing end or limit of all mortal being in the world (and not only, pace
Heidegger, pace Levinas and Derrida, our own only-too-human mortality).
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Reading Heidegger on death, Foucault’s reading of death in The Birth of the
Clinic recalls Nietzsche: ‘Death left its old tragic heaven and became the
lyrical core of man: his invisible truth, his visible secret.’ (Ibid.).
Foucault invokes Nietzsche and Heidegger as much as Schreber and
Lacan when he affirms that the ‘first scientific discourse about the individual had to pass through this stage of death. Western man could constitute himself in his own eyes as an object of science, he grasped within
himself, a discursive existence, only in the opening created by his own
elimination: from the experience of Unreason was born psychology . . .
from the integration of death into medical thought is born a medicine
that is given as a science of the individual. And, generally speaking, the
experience of individuality in modern culture is bound up with that of
death: from Hölderlin’s Empedocles to Nietzsche’s Zarathustra and so on
to Freudian man.’ (197).51 If Foucault goes on to discuss Empedocles in a
Hölderlinian mode, the emphasis is a Heideggerian one inasmuch as it is
a focus on death: ‘after Empedocles, the world is placed under the sign
of finitude, in that irreconcilable, intermediate state in which reigns the
law, the harsh law of limit.’ (198). Keeping to the tenor of Nietzsche’s own
reflections on genealogy, Foucault remarks that is perhaps understandable
that ‘the figures of knowledge and those of language should obey the
same profound law, and that the irruption of finitude should dominate in
the same way, this relation of man to death, which, in the first case, authorizes a scientific discourse in a rational form, and, in the second, opens
up the source of a language that unfolds endlessly in the void left by the
absence of the gods?’ (Ibid.).

Theory of knowledge, theory of science and
the agonistics of a discipline
The language of mathesis, taxinomia (or taxonomy), and genesis as
Foucault uses such terms in The Order of Things reveals his debt to Heidegger
but emphasizes the Kant he sought to underscore (almost like Adorno
who insisted on the need to privilege, alternately to be sure, both Kant
and Hegel). In this Kantian spirit, Foucault emphasizes the overall project of science in terms of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. Thus
the sciences ‘always carry within themselves the project, however remote
it may be, of an exhaustive ordering of the world.’ (The Order of Things
(OT) 74). Taxinomia, the idea of taxonomy has in the interim, following
Foucault but not less after Agamben as well as Borges and Eco, become
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quite common as Foucault had defined it and as Agamben following
Taubes had also defined it in distinctly Heideggerian terms: not only as a
matter of regional ontologies but ontic articulation and indeed not only
in terms of the very Heideggerian conception of mathesis 52 but a peculiarly
Heideggerian reflexive use as Foucault emphasizes that ‘Taxinomia is not in
opposition to mathesis: it resides within it and is distinguished from it; for
it too is a science of order—a qualitative mathesis.’ (OT 74). As the ‘knowledge of beings,’ taxinomia ‘treats of identities and differences’ as a ‘semiology confronted by history . . . it defines . . . the general law of beings, and
at the same time the conditions under which it is possible to know them’
(ibid.). Mathesis itself is to be understood, by contrast, ‘in the strict sense,’
as ‘a science of equalities, and therefore of attributions and judgments: it is
the science of truth.’ (Ibid.).
The contemporary critical change from the Classical period takes place
in the alteration of mathesis reframed to constitute ‘an apophantics and an
ontology’ leaving the human sciences or better said the humanities on the
side of ‘history and semiology’ on the hermeneutic schema Foucault traces
here, along with Ricoeur rather than with Gadamer ‘from Schleiermacher
to Nietzsche and Freud.’ (Ibid.).
Although and like Nietzsche and Heidegger, Foucault was concerned
with reading the history of science for the sake of a philosophical understanding of science, his readers have been chary of this association. Indeed,
apart from some early first attempts, only Ian Hacking has taken Foucault
as relevant for the philosophy of science and then only, and this has been
decisive for subsequent readings, in historical and social terms but that is
also to say as carefully distinguished from the philosophy of science proper.53 Foucault can also be read in correspondence with Heidegger’s own
reflections on physics qua physics or biology as biology when he observes
that historians of science
want to write histories of biology in the eighteenth century; but they do
not realize that biology did not exist then, and that the pattern of knowledge that has been familiar to us for a hundred and fi fty years is not valid
for a previous period. And that, if biology was unknown, there was a very
simple reason for it: that life itself did not exist. All that existed was living
beings, which were viewed through a grid of knowledge constituted by
natural history. (OT 127–128)
For Foucault, the very idea of natural philosophy as is under siege: the idea
of natural history is transformed taxonomically, finally to become biology
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(cf. OT 160–162). Biology, now defined as the ‘science of life,’ turns out
to be other than a philosophy of life and is hence and historically nothing
‘vital.’ Thus ‘Natural history is situated both before and after language;
it decomposes the language of everyday life, but in order to recompose it
and discover what has made it possible through the blind resemblances of
the imagination; it criticizes language, but in order to reveal its foundation.’ (OT 116). What is lacking is ‘radical questioning’ (ibid.) as Heidegger
defines it but what is at stake is the genesis of the very ‘life sciences’ themselves out of the spirit (or echoing Nietzsche: out of the death) of natural
history per se. Life thus ‘becomes one object of knowledge among others,
and is answerable, in this respect, to all criticism’ if it also ‘resists this critical
jurisdiction, which it takes over on its own account and brings to bear, in its
own name, on all possible knowledge.’ (OT 162). This echoes Heidegger’s
claim that the essence of technology is nothing technological54 as indeed
Heidegger’s still more intriguing claim that the essence of the polis ‘is nothing political.’55
Foucault’s reflection on the implications of Nietzsche’s teaching of the
Overman, his ‘Promise-Threat,’ as Foucault describes ‘the notion that man
would soon be no more—but would be replaced by the superman’ (OT
322), is combined with a rigorous reflection on the consequences of the
Eternal Return (legions of Nietzsche commentators have yet to do the
same), explaining that ‘this meant that man had long since disappeared
and would continue to disappear, and that our modern thought about
man, our concern for him, our humanism, were all sleeping serenely over
the threatening rumble of his non-existence.’ (Ibid.). Foucault’s reflections
are thoroughly epistemological in Nietzsche’s radical sense but also with
respect to Heidegger’s brief on humanism. This takes Foucault farther
than Heidegger, with a more extreme doubt than Descartes’ own and just
as Nietzsche called for a more radical doubt than Descartes.56 ‘Ought we
not to remind ourselves—we who believe ourselves bound to a finitude
which belongs only to us, and which opens up the truth of the world to us
by means of our cognition—ought we not to remind ourselves that we are
bound to the back of a tiger?’ (Ibid.).
The tiger’s back to which are bound is, of course, the dream tiger of
Nietzsche’s reflection upon the limits of truth and knowledge/reasoning/
power in his never published post-Kantian reflections on language, as on
grammar, social conventionality and logic, ‘On Truth and Lie in an ExtraMoral Sense.’57 Writing ‘beyond’ good and evil, Nietzsche proposes to consider the parallel right and wrong of rationality and logic itself. And so
Nietzsche borrows from standard texts to do so.58
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Reading between Heidegger and Nietzsche, Foucault accords with
Kant. The consequence is a tragically (in Nietzsche’s sense) rigorous (in
Heidegger’s sense) musing upon the limits of cognition, such as we find
in ‘The “Cogito” and the Unthought’ in The Order of Things. Speaking in
the same Kantian terms of the human being as ‘the locus of an empiricotranscendental doublet’ (OT 322), Foucault contends that ‘man is also the
locus of a misunderstanding’ (OT 323), finding its fundamental necessity ‘in the existence—mute, yet ready to speak, and secretly impregnated
with a potential discourse—of that not-known from which man is perpetually summoned towards self-knowledge.’ (Ibid.). This modality frames
Foucault’s revision of Kant, moving from the question ‘How can experience
of nature give rise to necessary judgments?’ (ibid.) to the very Nietzschean
and Heideggerian (cum Lacanian) question ‘How can man think what he
does not think, inhabit as though by a mute occupation something that
eludes him, animate with a kind of frozen movement that figure of himself that takes the form of a stubborn exteriority?’ (Ibid.). There is thus for
Foucault a fourfold shift, the question is no longer that ‘of truth, but of
being; not of nature, but of man; not of the possibility of understanding,
but of the possibility of a primary misunderstanding;’ (ibid.) and finally
and with respect to science the shift has been ‘from the possibility of a science of nature to the possibility for man to conceive of himself.’ (325)
Thus Foucault has all along been speaking of Heidegger if indeed by
way of Nietzsche and Hölderlin (cf. OT 333–335). And Foucault has been
speaking of Nietzsche all along, most of all when he invokes mathematics
in his concluding chapter on ‘The Human Sciences’ pointing out that ‘the
recourse to mathematics, in one form or another, has always been the simplest way of providing positive knowledge about man with a scientific style,
form, and justification,’ (OT 351), a point coordinate with Nietzsche’s contention that ‘mathematics is merely the means for the general and ultimate
knowledge of man.’ (GS §246).
If Heidegger’s counter to Heisenberg is right—Heisenberg had thought,
as Heidegger reflects on the observation that ‘man everywhere encounters
only himself’59 —Foucault’s vanishing subject is already Nietzsche’s, already
Heidegger’s. In this sense, Nietzsche’s plaintive cry ‘Two thousand years
and not a single new god!’ might suggest how we should hear the supposed
death of the subject. Nietzsche is the prophet of an end inaugurated not
so much by ‘the absence or the death of God . . . as the end of man’ (OT
385) and Foucault in a Heideggerian voice traces the ‘wake of that death
and in profound coordination with it—what Nietzsche’s thought heralds is
the end of his murderer: it is the explosion of man’s face in laughter, and
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the return of masks.’ (Ibid.). Echoing Heidegger’s anti-humanist reflections and hence far from a world transfigured in our own image, laughing in Nietzsche’s voice at our own and ongoing self-presumption—this
is Foucault’s ‘Promise-Threat’ of the Overman—‘one can certainly wager
that man would be erased, like a face drawn in sand at the end of the sea.’
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Problems in Contemporary Political Theory,’ Profiles and Critiques in Social Theory
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Press, 2002).
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of Ethics (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1985) among many others. Although Jacqueline Stevens, ‘On the Morals of Genealogy’ Political Theory 31/4 (2003): 558–588
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(Cambridge: Blackwell, 2006), 97–114.
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with Heidegger).
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